

Exelon Generation Company, LLC Dresden Nuclear Power Station 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, IL 60450-9765 www.exeloncorp.com

Nuclear

10 CFR 50.73

December 1, 2009

SVPLTR # 09-0059

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-25

NRC Docket No. 50-249

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 249/2009-001-00, "Unit 3 Group I Isolation and Automatic

Reactor Scram"

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 249/2009-001-00, "Unit 3 Group I Isolation and Automatic Reactor Scram" for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section."

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Ms. Marri Marchionda at (815) 416-2800.

Respectfully,

Tim Hanley

Site Vice President

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

Enclosure

cc:

Regional Administrator – NRC Region III

NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden Nuclear Power Station

IE22 NRR

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION						APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010											
(See reverse for required number of								Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internate-e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the									
digits/characters for each block)							information collection.										
FACILITY NAME Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3								2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE 1 OF 4									
4. TITLE Unit 3 Group I Isolation and Automatic Reactor Scram																	
5. E	VENT D	ATE	6. LER NUMBER			7. F	7. REPORT DATE					OTHER I	FACII	CILITIES INVOLVED			
молтн	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		MBER NO		DAY	YEAR	۱ ۲	CILITY N/A					i	N/A	
10	03	2009	2009	- 00	01 - 00	0 12	01	2009		CILITY N/A	NAME				DOCKET	NUMBER N/A	
9. OPER	ATING	MODE	11	. THIS	REPORT IS	S SUBMITTI	ED PURSI	UANT TO	о тні	E RE	QUIREME	NTS OF	10 C	FR §: (Che	ck all that	apply)	
1			20.2201(b) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i)				20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)				☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)			
10. POWER LEVEL		EL-	□ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) □ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i))(ii))(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)			☐ 73.7 ☐ 73.7 ☐ O TH	.73(a)(2)(x) .71(a)(4) .71(a)(5) ГНЕR ecify in Abstract below in NRC Form 366A						
FACILITY N	TAME					12. LICENS	SEE CONT	TACT FO	OR TI	HIS L	.ER		TE1 E1	SUICNIE NILIMOI	Codudo A	Cada)	
					n – Ali Abi				TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (815) 416-2811 FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT								
			13. COM	IPLET	E ONE LIN	E FOR EAC	H COMPO	NENT F	FAILU	JRE D	ESCRIBE	D IN TH	IS RE	PORT			
CAU	SE	SYSTEM	СОМРО	NENT	MANU- FACTUREF		ORTABLE DEPIX		AUSE	AUSE SYST		COMPONENT		MANU- FACTUREI		ORTABLE O EPIX	
N/	A	ļ 						1	N/A								
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED □YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)] NO		SUBI	(PECTE! MISSION)ATE		MONTH	DAY	YEAR			
ABSTRA	CT (Lim	nit to 1400	spaces,	i.e., ar	proximatel	y 15 single-s	spaced type	ewritten	lines)	, 							
On 10/03/2009 at approximately1735 hours while at full power, Unit 3 experienced an automatic reactor scram and Group I primary containment isolation signal. Due to the Group I isolation signal, the inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves closed as designed. Prior to the reactor scram, operators were restoring the reactor water clean-up (RWCU) system per the applicable station procedure.																	
The Probable Cause for the Group I isolation signal and reactor scram is attributed to a hydraulic pressure transient when restarting the RWCU system due to a latent procedure deficiency.																	

During the reactor scram, the shared Unit 2/3 emergency diesel generator automatically started when auxiliary power transferred from the main to the reserve power source.

The procedure for restarting the RWCU has been revised.

The safety significance of this event is minimal as plant response and operator actions were consistent with the protection of public health and safety and personnel safety.

NRC FORM 366A

(9-2007)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(LER)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	6. LER NUMBER	3. PAGE			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	05000249	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	9	OF	4
bresder reducer rower station, office		2009	- 001 -	00			7

NARRATIVE

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Unit 3 is a General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactor with a licensed maximum power level of 2957 megawatts thermal. The Energy Industry Identification System codes used in the text are identified as [XX].

A. **Plant Conditions Prior to Event:**

Unit: 03

Event Date: 10-03-2009

Event Time: 1735 hours

Reactor Mode: 1

Mode Name: Power Operation

Power Level: 100 percent

B. **Description of Event:**

On 10/03/2009 at approximately 1735 hours while at full power, Unit 3 experienced an automatic reactor scram and Group 1 primary containment isolation signal (PCIS) [JM]. Due to the Group I PCIS, the inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves closed as designed. In addition, PCIS Group 2 and Group 3 isolations were received and verified complete. Operators manually initiated the isolation condenser per the applicable procedure to control reactor pressure within limits.

Plant systems responded as expected with one exception: the Unit 2/3 EDG automatically started upon trip of the Unit 3 turbine at approximately 1736 hours on 10/03/2009 when auxiliary power transferred from the main to the reserve power source.

Prior to the reactor scram, operators were restoring the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system [CE] per station procedure DOP 1200-03, "RWCU System Operation with the Reactor at Pressure." Per the procedure, RWCU was being filled and heated in the blowdown mode with a flow path from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) to the main condenser. During this operation, the RWCU System Return to Reactor motor operated valve (MOV), 3-1201-7, was closed per DOP 1200-03. The Group I isolation occurred within a few seconds of opening the 3-1201-7 valve.

The RWCU system had tripped earlier on 10/02/09 at approximately 1100 hours. The 3-1201-7 valve remained closed for 30 hours and was opened after the system was filled and blowdown flow established. A root cause investigation determined that under these conditions, when the 3-1201-7 valve was opened, water upstream of the valve flashed to steam in the lower pressure region downstream of the valve and subsequently collapsed. The resulting pressure pulse was sensed by the RPV level transmitters, resulting in a Reactor Water Level Low SCRAM Signal and Reactor Water Level Low-Low Group I Isolation Signal.

The Group I Isolation and Automatic Reactor Scram event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section," as read in conjunction with item (1) of paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B), "Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip."

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	5. LER NUMBER		3. PAGE			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	05000249	YEAR 2009	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	3	OF	4	

NARRATIVE

The Unit 2/3 EDG automatic start is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section."

Unit 3 was returned to the grid on 10/7/2009 after completion of the forced outage plan.

C. Cause of Event:

The Probable Cause for the pressure pulse initiating Reactor Water Level Low-Low Group I Isolation Signal and Unit 3 Reactor SCRAM is attributed to a latent procedural deficiency. DOP 1200-03 provided inadequate guidance for the 3-1201-7 valve position during system restoration with the RPV at pressure. In GEK-323399, "Dresden 3 Reactor Water Clean-Up Operation and Maintenance Instructions," Section 3-11, the reactor vendor, General Electric, recommended that the Return to Reactor line MOV be in the open position for RWCU system start-up when the reactor is at power. This recommendation was not incorporated into DOP 1200-03. The procedure deficiency is historical.

The Cause of the Unit 2/3 EDG automatic start when auxiliary power transferred to the reserve power source is due to breaker contact response timing. During the fast transfer between the main and reserve feed breakers to the 4 kilovolt (kV) Bus 33, the "b" contacts on both the breakers (which are connected in series) were closed simultaneously for approximately 74 milliseconds. This provided sufficient time for the auto start relay of the Unit 2/3 EDG to be activated. Even though the EDG autostart was not expected, it is possible as there is no delay mechanism built into the electrical circuitry to absolutely prevent the autostart during a fast power transfer. The potential for EDG actuation in a particular situation depends on the relative speed and timing of the "b" contacts for the main and the reserve feed breakers to go from "closed" to "open" and from "open" to "closed," respectively.

D. Safety Analysis:

The risk significance of the event was analyzed. The core damage probability (CDP) and Large Early Release probability (LERP) calculations, in conjunction with the plant response and appropriate Operator actions taken, showed the event to be of low risk significance.

The safety significance of this event is minimal. The RPS and the Unit 2/3 EDG responded in a manner consistent with the protection of public health and safety and personnel safety. Operator actions were appropriate and consistent with normal and emergency operating procedures.

NRC FORM 366A (9-2007)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (I.F.R.) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO								
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKE	Г 6	6. LER NUMBER 3.						
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit	3 0500024	o YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.		OF	1		
Diesuen Nucleal Fower Station, Offic	0500024	2009	- 001 -	00	+	OI*	4		

NARRATIVE

E. Corrective Actions:

Procedure DOP 1200-03 has been revised, requiring the 3-1201-7 valve to be open prior to initiating RWCU system fill and vent activities.

Planned corrective actions for the Group 1 isolation and automatic reactor scram event include:

- Review of Operations procedures for RWCU and Feed Water [SJ] systems line-ups and valve sequencing that could create precursors for a hydraulic transient and subsequent pressure pulse that could reach the RPV
- Engineering evaluation of existing RWCU fill and vent procedure for adequacy and potential enhancements
- Revision to Operations' Pre-Job Briefings to include the potential for hydraulic transient induced pressure pulse

Planned corrective actions for the EDG autostart event include:

 Inspection of the main feed breaker and auxiliary feed breaker actuation mechanisms by the end of the refueling outage in 2010 to evaluate if the actuations are occurring at the optimal points in relation to each other.

F. Previous Occurrences:

A review of DNPS Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for the last three years did not identify any LERs associated with a similar hydraulic transient event, or an EDG actuation caused by a similar electrical system lineup.

G. Component Failure Data:

N/A